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probate assets. Most true apportionment problems arise out of poor draft-
ing of a tax provision in a will or out of no provision. In the latter situa-
tion we may assume that the testator was aware of the significance of this
omission and intended the consequence. However, it is more likely that
the omission occurred innocently and without realization of the conse-
quences.
Since the Del Drago decision, the courts and legislatures have followed
a definite trend by adopting apportionment in one form or another. In
view of the increasing employment of tax minimizing devices and the
subsequent disposition of property by means other than residuary estates
and intestacy, non-application of the apportionment doctrine places an
undue burden on the recipients of the residue estate. These recipients are
usually closely related to the decedent; therefore, there is no reason to place
the entire burden of the tax on them. If some reason existed to make such
placement advisable, it could be accomplished by proper will provisions.
A statute should reflect the interests of the public, and these interests can
best be served by Illinois' enactment of a federal estate tax apportionment
law.
Donald Glassberg
STATE JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
During the past two decades, there have been major jurisdictional dis-
putes over certain unfair labor practices. The conflict has arisen because
the same conduct may also constitute a common law tort, a breach of
contract, or an activity which the state, under its police power to provide
for the general welfare, has the authority to control. This comment
examines the general topic of pre-emption by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) over litigation involving unfair labor practices and
the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the Board.
Congress, pursuant to its delegated constitutional power to regulate
commerce among the states enacted the Labor Management Relations Act
in 1947.1 Commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, its purpose is to
promote the flow of commerce and protect the rights of individuals, em-
ployees, employers, labor organizations, and the public. 2 Prior to 1947,
Congress established the National Labor Relations Board under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Consisting of five members appointed by the
President with the advise and consent of the Senate, the Board is em-
I Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 1 (1964).
261 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
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powered to prevent any employer, labor organization, or its agents from
engaging in any unfair labor practice8 affecting commerce.4
The intent of Congress when it promulgated the Labor Management
Relations Act was to provide a uniform body of federal substantive law
to protect the rights of both management and employees. In order to
effectuate this purpose, it was mandatory that the NLRB, rather than
various state and federal tribunals be acknowledged as having primary
jurisdiction over acts constituting unfair labor practices. The Board is
given broad power to enjoin the activities of any person who commits an
unfair labor practice, and has the authority to order the reinstatement with
back pay of any employee who is the victim of an unfair labor practice
perpetrated by an employer or a labor organization.5 To enforce its orders,
the NLRB can petition any court of appeals of the United States or if all
the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation,
any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, re-
spectively, where the unfair labor practice occurred or where such person
resides or transacts business. The intent of this legislation was to grant the
NLRB exclusive and primary jurisdiction over labor disputes involving
unfair labor practices. To this end Congress provided that the finding of
the Board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.6
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The question of state control over labor disputes was raised as early as
1942 in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Ma-
chine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.7
In this case the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board order that the union, its officers, agents, and members
cease and desist from mass picketing of the employer's factory, threatening
personal injury and property damage to employees desiring to work, ob-
structing the entrance and exit of the factory, obstructing the streets and
public roads about the factory, and picketing the homes of employees.
The Court, relying on precedent to the effect that an intention of Congress
to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly mani-
fested, held that "Congress has not made such employee and union con-
duct as is involved in this case subject to regulation by the Federal
3 61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
4 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964).
5 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964).
661 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1964).
7315 U.S. 740 (1942).
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Board." Due to the absence of any conflict between the state legislation
and the federal enactment, and the failure of the federal act to regulate
such conduct, state control prevailed.
Subsequently, the Court again permitted state control and upheld an in-
junction issued by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board which for-
bade a local labor union, certified under the National Labor Relations Act
as collective bargaining representative for certain employees, from pro-
moting work stoppages. 9 Following the theory of Allen-Bradley, ° to the
effect that federal control had not been clearly manifested, the Court
found that recurrent unannounced work stoppages to gain various ends,
was neither forbidden by federal statute," nor approved. 12 Thus, the state
was free to govern her own internal affairs and regulate conduct which
had an obviously coercive effect. The Court recognized that concerted
union activities to aid unionization was protected activity under Federal
legislation, 3 however, since the action was found to be illegal, the fact that
it was in concert did not in itself take it out of the state's control.
In United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,'14 the Court held
that the state's interest in law and order precluded interpreting the Labor
Management Relations Act as providing the exclusive method of control-
ling union violence. However, this opinion must be distinguished from
Allen-Bradley,15 by the fact that it was rendered after Congress had pro-
vided that labor unions could commit unfair labor practices and conse-
quently could be enjoined by the NLRB. By this time the National Labor
Relations Act had been amended to prohibit unions from coercing em-
ployees who wanted to refrain from any concerted activities including
striking.16 Notwithstanding this amendment, the United Automobile17
opinion held that the act did not have such regulatory pervasiveness to
pre-empt state control in a situation such as here, where union members en-
8 Id. at 749.
9 International Union U.A.W.A., A. F. of L., Local 232, v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1948).
10 Supra note 7. 11 Supra note 3.
12 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1964).
13 Ibid. 14 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 15 Supra note 7.
16 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1). The statute provides: "(b) It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) To restrain or
coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157: . . ."
Section 157 states "Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining, or other mutual aid or protections, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ..
17 Supra note 14.
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gaged in mass picketing, obstructed access to the employer's plant and
coerced employees who desired to work with threats of physical violence.
Here again the state was left free to govern its own internal affairs.
In Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffers, and Helpers Local Union,' an action
was brought by an interstate trucking company to enjoin a union from
peaceful picketing in order to coerce the company to compel its em-
ployees to join the union. The suit was dismissed in the Pennsylvania state
courts,19 but affirmed by the Supreme Court20 which held that plaintiff's
grievance was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Contra to
Allen-Bradley21 which maintained that state police power could only be
overridden by express federal legislation, the Court here held that the fed-
eral legislation pre-empted state power to issue injunctive relief similar to
that available through the NRLB. Congress can save supplemental or
alternative state remedies by express terms, or by some clear implication,
22
but in the absence of this, legislation such as the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act pre-empts state action to prevent unfair labor practices.23 The
rationale for such exclusive jurisdiction was crystallized by the Court's
statement that,
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specifically
designated procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its sub-
stantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. 24
The Garner case,2 5 made it apparent that in the absence of violence
which compelled state action, federal control would prevail in regard to
the granting of injunctive relief. It indicated however, that the question
of jurisdiction over labor disputes was not a settled one. The Court recog-
nized that the federal act left much to the states, 26 though Congress had
not clearly designated the jurisdictional boundaries. The opinion con-
cluded, "We must spell out from conflicting indications of congressional
will the areas in which state action is still permissible. '27
18 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
19 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
20 Supra note 18. 21 Supra note 7. 22 Supra note 18, at 501.
23 Ibid. The court emphasized the exclusiveness of the federal act over state remedies
whether the federal power is constitutionally executed for the protection of public or
private interests or both. The enactment was recognized as the supreme law of the
land and the state courts could not adjudge the same controversy and extend its own
form of relief.
24 Supra note 18, at 490. 25 Supra note 18.
26 Ibid. See also, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 336 U.S. 301, 313 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Rela-
tions Board, 330 U.S. 767, 773 (1947); Hill v. Fla., 325 U.S. 538, 539 (1945).
27 Supra note 18, at 488.
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COMMON LAW DAMAGES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,28 the
corporation sued three labor organizations in a Virginia state court 29 and
recovered damages in a common law tort action despite the fact that the
complaint constituted an unfair labor practice. In this instance, union
agents demanded that Laburnum Corporation employees join the United
Construction Workers and that the corporation recognize the United
Construction Workers as the sole bargaining agent for the corporation's
employees in Kentucky. When the corporation refused to comply and
many of its employees did not join, the union agents threatened Laburnum
officers and employees with violence, forcing the company to abandon its
projects in the area. The Supreme Court,30 on review of the state court's
decision granting relief,31 affirmed the decision, recognizing that the fed-
eral act provided for no general compensatory procedure except in minor
supplementary ways.3 2 It noted that there was no conflict between state
and federal administrative remedies as in the Garner case.' 3 Since Congress
did not provide any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for
collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct, the Court con-
cluded that,
[i]f Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where the fed-
eral preventive administrative procedures are impotent, or inadequate, the of-
fenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy property without lia-
bility for the damage done. 34
The Court in International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Russell35 following the
principles of Laburnum,36 upheld the jurisdiction of the Alabama state
courts. In a common law tort action, Russell, a non-union employee,
sought to recover damages from the union for malicious interference with
his lawful occupation. The complaint alleged that due to the union's mass
picketing and threats of violence during a strike, he was prevented from
entering the plant where he was employed, and from engaging in his em-
ployment for over a month. The Court held that the act did not give the
Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter as to preclude
the state court from entertaining the action and awarding compensatory
and punitive damages. Consistent with the Court's attitude in Allen-Brad-
28 347 U.S. 656 (1954). 80 Supra note 28.
29 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953). 3' Supra note 29.
3261 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
33 Supra note 18. 35 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
84 Supra note 28, at 669. 36 Supra note 28.
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ley,"7 the Court'concluded that in the absence of a clearer declaration of
federal policy, an employee could recover in a state court all damages
caused him by this type of tortious conduct.
Although the Court concluded that the defendant's conduct constituted
an unfair labor practice and that the NLRB could have granted Russell
partial relief in the form of back pay, it did not consider this sufficient to
deprive state courts of jurisdiction to award common law tort damages.
The Court emphasized that the type of conflict of remedies which would
result in pre-emption by the NLRB were those in which one forum would
enjoin, as illegal, conduct which the other forum would find legal, or
where the state courts would restrict the exercise of rights guaranteed by
federal legislation. Thus, in Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin
Board,38 the Court held that a state statute restricting the right to strike
and compelling arbitration by public utility employees, was invalid for it
denied a right which Congress had guaranteed under the Taft-Hartley
Act; the right to strike peacefully to enforce union demands for wages,
hours, and working conditions. In the Garner case,39 and Weber v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc.,40 the Court expressed similar sentiments. In the Weber
case, there was a dispute between two unions over work being performed
for Anheuser-Busch. When one union struck, Anheuser-Busch filed a
complaint in a Missouri state court alleging violations of the federal act
constituting unfair labor practices, and was granted an injunction by the
state court.41 On appeal the injunction was reversed on the theory that if
the conduct reasonably brought the controversy within the sections of the
federal act prohibiting unfair labor practices or if the conduct could
reasonably be deemed to come within the protection afforded by the act,
the state court would have to decline jurisdiction in deference to the
NLRB.42 Subsequently, the test for NLRB jurisdiction became one of de-
termining if the conduct was "arguably" subject to the provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,43 a leading case in the
area of pre-emption, broadened considerably the authority of the NLRB.44
37 Supra note 7.
38 340 U.S. 383 (1951). See also Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957), in
which the Court held that the state cannot enjoin all picketing of employees, but
only that picketing which would incite violence, since peaceful picketing is protected
under the Taft-Hartley Act and within the NLRB's jurisdiction to pass upon.
39 Supra note 18.
40 348 U.S. 468 (1954). 42 Supra note 40.
41 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W.2d 325 (1954). 43 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
44 Ibid. The Court held that when the activity was arguably subject to the federal
legislation, the state's jurisdiction was displaced even if the NLRB did not assert juris-
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In that case a California partnership refused to agree with the union to
retain in their employment only those workers who were already mem-
bers of the union, or who applied for membership within thirty days, be-
cause none of the employees had shown an interest in joining the union.
Upon refusal, the union began to peacefully picket the employers place of
business and to exert pressure on customers and suppliers in order to per-
suade them to stop dealing with the partnership. The California court,
finding that the sole purpose of these pressures was to compel execution of
the proposed contract, granted relief.45 The court considered the union's
conduct rather than the remedy available, as the prime determinative of
federal control. In reversing the state court's award of damages the Su-
preme Court implied that in the absence of tortious conduct of a violent
nature, which imminently threatens the public order, the state was power-
less to award damages for conduct arguably an unfair labor practice.
In the Supreme Court's majority opinion written by Justice Frankfurter,
the Court held that, "[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by Sec. 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under
Sec. 8,"40 state and federal court jurisdiction must yield to the exclusive
competence of the NLRB. The opinion insisted that it was not the na-
tional policy to allow courts either to enjoin such action or award dam-
ages, in the absence of conduct which was merely a peripheral concern of
the Labor Management Relations Act or conduct which involved interests
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. Contrary to the Court's
concern in earlier decisions such as Laburnum47 and Russell,48 that the
complainant should be fully compensated for the tortious interference
with his rights, and that only the courts and not the NLRB could ade-
quately compensate the aggrieved party, the Court here was not troubled
diction over the claim. This holding created a no-man's land in which there were cases
not subject to any court or agency regulation. Subsequently Congress legislated to cor-
rect this void. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c) (1964) states: "(1) The Board,
in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to
the Administration Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
involving any class or category of employees, where, in the opinion of the Board, the
effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, that the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the stand-
ards prevailing upon August 1, 1959. (2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent
or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory (including the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and assertingjurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection to assert jurisdiction."
4549 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 243 (1958).
40 Supra note 43, at 244. 47 Supra note 28. 48 Supra note 35.
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by the fact that the plaintiff could not receive sufficient remuneration in
the form of money damages from the NLRB.
Justice Harlan concurred with the majority in reversing the state court's
award of damages solely on the ground that the union activity could
possibly have been considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act. He
asserted, however, that if the union's conduct was unprotected activity un-
der federal regulation, the California judgment would have to be sustained
on the basis of the Laburnum49 and Russell50 decisions. This would be true
even if such conduct was found to be federally prohibited. Emphasizing that
there was no federal-state conflict over remedies if the union activity was
prohibited, Harlan maintained that the majority opinion severely limited
the state's power to furnish an effective remedy for non-violent tortious
conduct which was not federally protected, but which may have been
federally prohibited. He commented that the narrow reparation power of
the NLRB would permit those injured by non-violent conduct to go
remediless. The Justice quoted from Laburnum as follows:
To the extent, however that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing
with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no
ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious
conduct have been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to demon-
strate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in
that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state pro-
cedure would have survived.51
Harlan contended that the Laburnum and Russell decisions only rendered
the violence therein unprotected, but they did not determine the type of
conduct for which the state could award damages.
In a Supreme Court decision handed down this year, Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114,52 the Court seemed to echo
some of the theories expressed by Justice Harlan in the Garmon case.53 In
a civil action by a company manager against the union for damages for
alleged defamation in the course of a labor organization campaign, the
lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that the NLRB had ex-
clusive jurisdiction under the pre-emption ground of Garmon. The circuit
court affirmed, holding that such conduct would arguably constitute an
unfair labor practice under the federal act.5 4 The Supreme Court however,
reversed the decision holding that where either party to a labor dispute
circulates, with malice, false and defamatory statements during a union
organizing campaign, the court has jurisdiction to apply state remedies. 55
49 Supra note 28.
50 Supra note 35. 55 Supra note 43.
51 Supra note 28, at 665. 54 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
52 383 U.S. 53 (1966). 55 Supra note 52, at 55.
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State action was thus justified because the conduct fell within those classes
of cases which the Court considered not to have been pre-empted by fed-
eral legislation: 56 cases involving situations in which the activity regulated
was a peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act or
where the conduct involved interests deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility.
Justice Clark, who wrote the Linn opinion, justified state jurisdiction by
citing Laburnum57 and Russell58 to the effect "that a State's concern with
redressing malicious libel is so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsi-
bility that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by Gar-
mon."59 The Court acknowledged the fact that the NLRB might find that
an employer or union committed an unfair labor practice and violated the
act by deliberately making false statements. However, it was concerned,
as was Harlan in his concurring opinion in Garmon,60 with the remedial
aspect of granting the state jurisdiction to award damages and examine the
conduct of the parties. Because of "the Board's lack of concern with the
personal injury caused by malicious libel, together with its inability to
provide redress to the maligned party,""' the ordinary arguments for pre-
emption were insufficient. The Court did not feel that this would im-
pair the jurisdiction of the NLRB, for the injured party might request
both administrative and judicial relief. This contention however, is not
consistent with the intent of Congress to provide a uniform body of fed-
eral substantive law for the protection of the rights of both management
and labor. The opinion sanctions what the Court admittedly wanted to
eliminate in previous pre-emption decisions: two governing lawmaking
sources, the state and the federal government, the former protecting its
citizens against defamation, the later controlling unfair labor practices.
In his dissent, in the Linn case,6 2 Justice Fortas, concerned with this dis-
regard for the intent of Congress, stated that the majority, by permitting
state action, "introduced a potentially disruptive device into the compre-
hensive structure created by Congress,"6 for resolving disputes arguably
constituting an unfair labor practice. Recognizing that the standards for
determining a libel suit and the criteria applied in examining labor disputes
are different, Justice Fortas contended that the result may likely reflect
local attitudes toward unionization rather than "appreciation for the un-
56 Supra note 52. The Court placed major reliance upon the following cases: Inter-
national Union, United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corporation, 374 U.S. 656 (1954).
57 Supra note 28.
58 Supra note 35. 61 Supra note 52, at 64.
59 Supra note 52, at 62. 62 Supra note 52, at 69.
60 Supra note 43, at 249. 63 Ibid.
COMMENTS
derlying, long term perplexities of the interplay of management and labor
in a democratic society. '64 Clearly, Justice Fortas did not view the union
conduct as activity which remained within the traditional powers of the
state to control. Following the theory of Garner,65 that supplemental or
alternative remedies for unfair labor practices could be saved only by ex-
press congressional terms or clear implication, he cited legislation author-
izing suits for damages arising out of unfair labor practices,6" and statutory
provisions authorizing judicial remedies where the NLRB declines to
assert jurisdiction.6 7 In addition, in certain cases, the NLRB has the power
to cede jurisdiction to any state or territory even though they may involve
labor disputes affecting commerce,68 and the federal district courts may
hear suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization, representing employees in an industry affecting commerce,
or between such labor organizations.69 When such a breach of contract
also includes an unfair labor practice the Supreme Court has held that a
suit can be maintained in a state court for damages for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.70 Nevertheless, the Court has stated that if
"there are situations in which serious problems will arise from both the
courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts which amount to an
unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases when they arise." 71
The Linn opinion, as Justice Fortas states, opens a major breach in the
wall which has previously confined labor disputes to the regulations de-
fined by federal labor law. This decision may seriously impair the author-
ity of the NLRB over conduct involving an unfair labor practice. When
conduct amounts to an unfair labor practice, the fact that the state can
more fully compensate the aggrieved party should not be a prime element
in determining jurisdiction. Professor Kadish of the University of Cali-
fornia, reflecting on the Linn departure from the standards established in
641d. at 71. 65 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
6661 Stat. 159 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
67 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 5 164 (c) (1964).
6861 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 160 (a) (1964).
69 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. S 185 (a) (1964).
7oSmith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Cf. 375 U.S. 261 (1964);
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 375 U.S. 261 (1964). The Court held
that contractual arbitration would be compelled where the conduct alleged could also
be the basis for invoking NLRB jurisdiction. However, the Court clearly indicated
that the submission of the dispute to an arbitrator did not terminate the Board's juris-
diction. The Court stated at 268 "An alternative remedy before the Board is available
which if invoked by the employer will protect him." Recognizing that the Board's
authority is superior, the Court at 272 held "Should the Board disagree with the arbiter
... the Board's ruling should, of course, take precedence ......
71 Smith v. Evening News Association, 371, U.S. 195, 198 (1962).
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Garmon,72 has stated that the Court may be ready "to subordinate the
interests of federal regulatory policy to the interest in filling in regulatory
voids. ' 73 If his observation is correct, state jurisdiction over tortious activ-
ity involving an unfair labor practice will not be confined to violent con-
duct. Nevertheless, the question of whether the state has the jurisdiction to
award tort damages for non-violent tortious conduct which may con-
stitute an unfair labor practice, is not resolved. It appears, however, that
greater state control over a broad range of tortious activity may whittle
always at the oft time referred to exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over
unfair labor practices. The Court's tendency, however, to emphasize the
remedy as one basis for granting the state jurisdiction to adjudicate con-
duct which may also be an unfair labor practice has not been limited to
litigation involving torts.
STATE CONTROL OVER INTERNAL UNION CONFLICTS
An emphasis on remedies was in a large measure responsible for an
earlier inroad on federal control of conduct which might arguably con-
stitute an unfair labor practice. In International Association of Macbinists
v. Gonzales,74 decided the same day as Russell,75 the Supreme Court
affirmed a California state court decision which had ordered a union mem-
ber reinstated in his union and had awarded him damages for his illegal ex-
pulsion. The state court held that under California law, membership in a
labor union constituted a contract between the member and the union, and
that state law provided through mandatory reinstatement and damages, a
remedy for the breach.76 The Supreme Court held that "the protection of
union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by
unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and in-
deed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied. ' 77 The
Court maintained that precluding a state court from its jurisdiction to
enforce the rights of union members would often leave an unjustly ousted
member without a remedy for restoration of his membership rights, since
the NLRB has not been granted the authority to order the reinstatement
of membership in a union.
In its appeal, the union objected to the award of damages for loss of
wages and the suffering resulting from the breach of contract on the
theory that the NLRB could have awarded partial relief in the form of
back pay if there was a finding of an unfair labor practice. However the
72 Supra note 43.
73 CCH. Lab. L. Rep., Labor Law Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
8035 (1966).
74 356 U.S. 617 (1958). 76 142 Cal. App.2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1957).
75 Supra note 35. 77 Supra note 74, at 620.
COMMENTS
Court was interested in permitting the injured party, as in the Russell
case,78 to recover all damages available under state law. Justice Frank-
furter, the author of the Gonzales opinion, was not disturbed by the fact
that the union's conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, nor did the
possibility of a conflict of remedies over an award of back pay, unlike
Garner, 7 compel the Court to hold state jurisdiction pre-empted. As the
Court indicated, a remote possibility of conflict with the enforcement of
the national policy by the NLRB was no barrier to state action. The justi-
fication for state jurisdiction, in order to assure an injured party a remedy,
notwithstanding the fact that the conduct might involve an unfair labor
practice, paralleled the theory subsequently expressed in Linn,80 which
emphasized that an injured party might remain remediless if such litigation
was pre-empted to federal administrative authority.
Chief Justice Warren, in his critical dissent in the Gonzales case, argued
that the majority opinion aflirmed a duplication of remedies that the Court
had earlier condemned in Garner8l and that the decision would frustrate
the remedial patterns of the federal act. The majority, however, was not
concerned in either Gonzales or Linn, that the decisions would encourage
parties to seek out state relief, rather than submitting the dispute to the
NLRB which could provide uniformity in the regulation of labor rela-
tions. The Court rather, distinguished the type of union conduct subject
to state jurisdiction from that which would come under federal regula-
tion:
[T]he state court proceedings deal with arbitrariness and misconduct vis-a-vis
the individual union members and the union; the Board proceeding, looking
principally to the nexus between union action and employer discrimination, ex-
amines the ouster from membership in entirely different terms.82
Subsequent decisions holding litigation involving union-member conflict
pre-empted to the NLRB, have justified and distinguished Gonzales on the
basis that the activity regulated was merely a peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act,88 and the internal affairs of unions were
not in themselves matters within the NLRB's competence. s4 These defenses
for state involvement rather than submission of the alleged claim to the
NLRB, tend to emphasize the fact that jurisdictional questions in cases
which arguably involve an unfair labor practice will be decided somewhat
on an ad hoc basis, because the criteria set down in Gonzales do not
delineate clearly classes of actions which are subject to either state control
or federal regulation. The Court in Gonzales stated that, "the statutory
78 Supra note 35. 80 Supra note 52. 82 Supra note 74, at 623.
79346 U.S. 485 (1953). 81 Supra note 79. 88 Supra note 43.
84 Local 100, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S.
690 (1963).
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implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has
been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concrete-
ness by the process of litigating elucidation." 8
In contrast to the conduct in Gonzalez, where the Court allowed state
adjudication, the interference by a union with a member's employment
opportunities appears to represent an area of conduct which is free from
state regulation. Where there is such union interference, arguably involv-
ing an unfair labor practice, the Court has held that the NLRB has the ex-
clusive power to make the initial determination.8" Two opinions handed
down the same day, Local 100, United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices v. Borden 7 and Local No. 207, International Assoc. of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perko,8 distinguished
Gonzales and indicated the limitations on state power under Gonzales.89
In both instances the conduct was held to be within the initial jurisdiction
of the NLRB, since both constituted union interference with its members'
employment, rather than union conduct in regard to union membership.
In Perko,90 a union member alleged that the union had prevented him
from obtaining work as a foreman by representing to employers that his
foreman's rights had been suspended. In Borden,91 a member of a Loui-
siana plumbers' union sued for damages in a Texas state court. The plain-
tiff, Borden, had gone to Dallas, Texas, to find a job with a particular con-
struction company whose hiring was done by union referral. He was un-
able to obtain the referral from the business agent of the Dallas local of the
plumbers' union, although the agent had previously accepted his clearance
card from the Louisiana local and the company had requested the agent to
send him over. In his suit, Borden alleged that the union's actions consti-
tuted a wilful, malicious, and discriminatory interference with his right to
contract and to pursue a lawful occupation; that the union breached a
promise implicit in the membership arrangement not to discriminate un-
fairly or to deny any member the right to work; and that the defendants
had violated certain state statutory provisions. The state court awarded
damages and rejected the union's pre-emption argument.92 The Supreme
Court however, upheld the union's argument and reversed the decision for
the union, rejecting the defense of Borden that the state court's jurisdiction
was not pre-empted under the principles declared in Gonzales.
85 Supra note 74, at 619.
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Ornamental Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701. (1963).
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COMMENTS
Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Borden, suggests that this case is indis-
tinguishable from Gonzales.93 He contends that the Borden litigation, like
that in Gonzales, arose out of a dispute between Borden and his union over
the scope of his union membership rights. Consequently both involved in-
ternal union matters. Notwithstanding this similarity, the majority opinion
indicates that it will grant the NLRB initial jurisdiction if the aggrieved
party asserts union interference with employment opportunities through
unfair labor practices. If however, the primary remedy sought is restora-
tion of membership in the union, the state retains jurisdiction, since the
NLRB has no authority to reinstate a member in his union.
CONCLUSION
A noticeable absence of clear congressional will has contributed to the
confusion as to what constitutes a labor dispute which the NLRB can
adjudicate, and what litigation still remains within the purview of the
state. Decisions by the Supreme Court, discussed in this comment, have
reflected this absence. Moreover, the intent of Congress to create a body
of federal substantive law to be uniformly applied to labor disputes, has
not usurped state jurisdiction in cases where the state has traditionally had
the authority to act, or where the NLRB cannot provide an adequate
remedy. The Court has held that violent tortious conduct may be enjoined
by the state. In addition, the state has the authority to award damages for
such conduct, notwithstanding the fact that the activity involved an un-
fair labor practice. In order to provide a union member with a remedy for
wrongful ouster from his union, the Court has granted the state jurisdic-
tion to order reinstatement on the theory that this is an internal union con-
flict. Where an employee alleges union interference with employment
opportunities, the court has denied the state jurisdiction, although this too
may constitute an internal union conflict. The recent decision in the Linn
case, 4 which held that the state has jurisdiction in a libel suit, concluded
in regard to state libel remedies and national labor policy; "If experience
shows that a more complete curtailment, even a total one, should be neces-
sary to prevent impairment of that policy, the Court will be free to recon-
sider today's holding."'9 5 It is thus clear that pre-emption to the NLRB is
not pervasive when conduct arguably involves an unfair labor practice and
the courts will continue to enter the area of labor disputes.
James Burstein
94 Supra note 52. 95 Id. at 67.93 Supra note 74.
